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Abstract 
This paper analyzes whether the decreasing progressivity of the US Federal Tax 
system appear to affect taxpayer satisfaction. I use data from the publicly available 
General Social Survey and combine them with average tax rates from Piketty and Saez 
(2007). In this study, two distinct questions are addressed: (1) Is a taxpayer’s belief that 
his or her own federal income tax is too high affected by their actual average tax rates? 
(2) Is a taxpayer’s belief that his or her own federal income tax is too high affected by the 
progressivity of the federal income tax?  
The results show that taxpayer dissatisfaction is consistently positively correlated 
to average taxes and progressivity. Upon dividing up our respondents to income quintiles, 
my results reveal two interesting findings: (1) the magnitude of dissatisfaction for a given 
increase in average taxes follows a U shaped pattern across the income quintiles, where 
taxpayers in the third quintile were most responsive to fluctuations in tax rates, (2) the 
magnitude and strength of the correlation between the various progressivity variables and 
taxpayer dissatisfaction was consistent for all income quintiles, implying that taxpayers 
are not recognizing changes in progressivity. These findings disclaim the homo 
economicus assumption. Further, after dividing our respondents based on their 
educational attainment, I find that taxpayers with higher levels of education are more 
responsive to changes in tax rates.  
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“In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes. ”  
Benjamin Franklin writing to Jean Baptiste Le Roy, November 13 1789 
 
Introduction  
On September 19, 2011 President Barrack Obama proposed what he called the 
“Buffet Rule”, a guiding principle that the very wealthy should not pay a lower rate of 
federal tax than the middle class. Warren Buffet had long been an advocate for the reform 
of the US Federal Tax system which he believed favored the ultra wealthy, enabling 
individuals like himself to pay an effective tax rate of 17.4 percent, lower than the 30 
percent rate paid by his secretary (Buffett, 2011). Since the explosion of the Occupy Wall 
street movement, the issue of increasing income inequality, and the growing perception 
that the federal government is unfair, especially with regards to their treatment of taxes 
for the very wealthy, has hit the spotlight. As it should. There exists no other legislation 
whose affects are as widespread and significant as those of taxation.   
A solid tax system is imperative to the success of every government. Its roles 
range from the distribution of public goods to the redistribution of wealth. Residents pay 
taxes in exchange for various goods and services from the government. Thus in this 
context, taxpayers can be viewed as investors and taxes their investment in the 
government. Understanding investor satisfaction is important to maintain the success of 
investments.  
Public perception of and satisfaction in the federal tax system, has long been 
acknowledged as essential to the success of the government. Not only is tax perception 
important because it is correlated to tax compliance, but studies have shown there exists a 
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break down in trust for the government if taxpayers believe the system is unfair 
(Rawlings, 2003).   
For the last 40 years the US Federal Tax System has undergone dramatic changes. 
In this paper I analyze whether these changes appeared to affect taxpayer satisfaction.  
Using data from the publicly available General Social Survey and tax rates from Piketty 
and Saez (2007), I show that taxpayer dissatisfaction is consistently positively correlated 
to average taxes and progressivity. Upon dividing up our respondents to income quintiles, 
my results reveal two interesting findings: (1) the magnitude of dissatisfaction for a given 
increase in average taxes follows a U shaped pattern across the income quintiles, with 
taxpayers in the third quintile being most responsive to fluctuations in tax rates, (2) the 
magnitude and strength of the correlation between the various progressivity variables and 
taxpayer dissatisfaction was consistent for all income quintiles, implying that taxpayers 
are not recognizing changes in progressivity. These findings reveal that the homo 
economicus assumption, often used by public policy researchers, is inappropriate with 
regards to tax policy. Further, after dividing our respondents based on their educational 
attainment, I find that taxpayers with higher levels of education are more responsive to 
changes in tax rates.  
The remainder of the paper will be organized as follows. In the next section, I will 
briefly present the theories of justice, fairness and taxpayer preferences. Next, I will 
summarize the changes in income inequality and progressivity since the 1960’s. Then I 
will describe the data, procedure and results to my empirical study. In the final section I 
will summarize the findings and offer some conclusions.  
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Background 
JUSTICE, FAIRNESS AND TAXPAYER PREFERENCES  
Although past research has mainly concentrated on the economic factors of tax 
compliance, a growing number of researchers have begun to look at ‘non-economic’ 
factors to taxpayer’s evaluation on the tax system.  
When forming opinions on the tax system, taxpayers consider three things: equity, 
simplicity and self-interest (Milliron, Watkins, & Karlinsky, 1987). Equity as the ultimate 
goal of a good tax system had existed since Adam Smith in his canons of taxation in 1796 
and widely accepted by the public.  Taxpayer morale is largely dependent on their belief 
that taxes are fair, and maintaining such moral is critical for tax systems such as the US, 
which is largely based on self-reporting and voluntary compliance (United States Dept. of 
the Treasury: Office of the Secretary, 1984). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was in part 
proposed in order to change the growing perception that the tax system was unfair 
(United States Dept. of the Treasury: Office of the Secretary, 1984). Having said this, 
defining a ‘fair’ tax system, which can be applied to various groups across time, is 
difficult.  
Within public finance, there are two commonly used approaches to this question: 
the benefit principle and the ability to pay principle. The benefit principle states that 
taxpayers should pay according to the benefits received from the government. The 
exchange is considered equitable if taxpayers believe that the benefits they receive from 
the government is proportional to the amount of taxes they pay. However, fairness as a 
terms of exchange with the government has become less relevant as government 
expenditures have shifted from expenditures that might benefit everyone in the 
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community, such as bridges and public buildings, to expenditures on special programs 
which target a specific group, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit which provides 
financial assistance only for eligible low-income households (Bradley, 1984). The ability 
to pay is based on the principle that each individual should contribute to the government 
in accordance with how much they are able to pay. This approach is tied to the theory of 
Horizontal Equity, individuals with the same income pay the same amount, and Vertical 
Equity, individuals who are wealthier pay more (Gerbing, 1988).  
Researchers have also identified three elements to justice in taxation: procedural 
justice, retributive justice and distributive justice (Wenzel, 2003). Procedural justice deals 
with the fairness of the process of resource allocation. Retributive justice refers to 
fairness in the consequences and treatment of those who break the established rules. 
Distributive justice refers to the fairness in the outcome of resource allocation or 
distribution. The issues considered in distributive justice are tax burdens, tax based 
benefits and avoidance/evasion opportunities (Wenzel, 2003). This last point is 
particularly important as the current tax system’s allows for various exemptions that are 
applicable to only the very wealthy, enabling them to have an effective tax rate that is 
lower than the general public.  
To further understand our analysis, it is important to note that individuals will 
more often evaluate the desirability of their current position not in absolute terms, but in 
relative terms to other point in times as well as other people. Psychological research has 
found that individuals often identify themselves as part of different groups, based on the 
perceived “sharedness and consensus on distinctive group interest” (Wenzel, 2003). This 
creates a distinct attitude of in-group and out-group, where individuals might feel a 
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competitiveness or hostility towards those in the out-group. The growing income 
inequalities since the 1980’s has resulted in individuals distancing themselves from their 
identity as Americans and rather identify themselves as members of different income 
groups. There exists particular hostility towards the top 1% who has captured more than 
half of the US economic growth since the 1980’s and more recently, have captured 93% 
of the income gains in 2010, and the bottom 20% who pay a small portion of the overall 
tax rates but still receive a notable portion of government benefits (Saez, 2012).  
Individuals and groups may judge the equity of their tax burden based on the 
above three points. They may compare themselves to others who they believe are in the 
same income group, in the case of horizontal equity, or, in the case of vertical equity, 
they may compare themselves to others who they believe are in other income groups. 
Individuals may also make judgments of their current tax level on their past tax burden. 
Wartick (1994) found that taxpayers perceived changes in the tax law to be unfair if it 
made them worse off. Taxpayers also lose trust in the tax system if they believe that 
others aren’t paying their share, particularly with regards to the wealthy. Gerbing (1988) 
found that taxation towards the rich was a major factor in determining fairness in 
taxation. Research by Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) found that among respondents who 
stated their tax burden was too high, 75% of them attributed their dissatisfaction towards 
the significant tax avoidance by wealthy taxpayers. Their opinions however appear to be 
grounded on lack or misinformation, and their perceptions overestimate the level in 
which wealthy individuals take advantage of loopholes and avoid taxes. A	   study	   by	  McKee	   and	   Gerbing	   (1989)	   of	   two	   large	   cities	   found	   that	   residents	   believed	   that	  
	   10	  
45%	  of	  millionaires	  pay	  no	  income	  taxes,	  however,	  actual	  data	  from	  the	  IRS	  indicate	  that	  fewer	  than	  2%	  of	  millionaires	  pay	  no	  taxes	  in	  any	  given	  year. 
Studies of public preference for tax systems by Gerbing (1988), Seidl and Traub  
(2001), Edlund (2003) all concluded the general public preferred a progressive tax 
system. Roberts and Hite (1994) conducted a study of 600 US taxpayers shortly after the 
1986 Tax Reform Act. The study revealed that most respondents preferred a progressive 
tax system, however amongst this group, there existed three distinct groups which varied 
in the level of progressiveness: Steep Progressives, Mild Progressives and Flatraters. The 
percentages dissatisfied by the fairness of the current system were 70%, 59% and 78% 
respectively. Interestingly, they find that actual effective tax rates at that time were lower 
than public preferences even amongst those who state that their current tax level is too 
high. Inconsistencies in answers depending on if they were presented in real or abstract 
terms has raised questions on the reliability of the results and rather indicate a general 
lack of information or understanding of progressivity and the tax system.   
 
PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
Since the 1960’s the US federal tax system has undergone significant changes 
which have shifted the system in the direction of less progressivity. Changes in the tax 
code as well as the changes in the pattern of the sources and size of income, especially for 
the very wealthy, has resulted in unprecedented levels of income inequality.   
Kuznet (1955) hypothesized that income inequality should follow an inverse U-
shape; increasing with industrialization and then falling as the larger public are able to 
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reap the benefits and move into high productive sectors of the economy.  However, the 
current state of the US income distribution evidently contradicts this hypothesis.  
Piketty and Saez (2003) found that top shares in the US followed a U-shape since 
the 1900, falling during WWI and the Great Depreciation and rapidly increasing since 
1960’s.  The share of after-tax income accruing to the top 1%, at 17.1%, reached its 
highest level since 1979 in 2007 while, during this same period, the share going to the 
middle one-fifth population reached its lowest level of 14.1 %  (Sherman & Stone, 2010).  
Throughout the years, the US economy has undergone significant economic growth, 
however, evidence shows that the majority of the growth was captured by only the top 
1%.   From 1993 to 2010 the average real income per family increased by 13.8%, 
however, if one excludes the top 1%, real income for the 99% only grew by 6.4% 
Comparatively, the incomes of the top 1% grew by 58% during this 17 year period (Saez, 
2012).   
They also found that the income composition for the top bracket has changed 
significantly from 1929 to 1998, with percentage of capital income for the 90-95% 
bracket falling from 20% to 5%, and wage income increasing from 60% to 90%.  
Dividing the top income bracket further, however, also illustrates differences in the 
income composition within each subdivision, whereby the top .01% hold more in capital 
and entrepreneurial income compared to those in the top 10% bracket, all though less 
than 1929 levels. The increase in the wage component of income was also accompanied 
by an increase in the average salaries of CEO’s in the top one percent since the 1970’s 
while the bottom 99% experienced dismal growth. This point was further reiterated in 
Saez (2004).   
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A study by Piketty and Saez (2007) calculated the average effective federal tax 
rate paid by every income bracket. Adopting the income groups in Piketty and Saez 
(2003) and using publicly available individual tax returns, Piketty and Saez were able to 
estimate the effective federal tax which include the individual income tax, corporate 
income tax, estate (and gift) tax and the payroll tax. Table 1, replicated from Piketty and 
Saez (2007), presents the pattern of the average federal tax for different income groups 
from the 1960’s to 2004.  
In the 1960’s the top marginal rate for the highest income was 91 percent, resulting in 
an effective average tax rate of up to 71.4 percent for the top .01 percent compared to the 
average tax rate of 13.9 percent for the bottom twenty percent. Tax evasion was 
prominent; in 1981 the IRS estimated uncollected taxes on legal income of about $81.5 
billion (United States Dept. of the Treasury: Office of the Secretary, 1984). Growing 
concern that the past tax structure was unfair, overly complex and inefficient prompted 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Some of the most important changes include (United States 
Dept. of the Treasury: Office of the Secretary, 1984):  
1. Reduction in tax brackets from over a dozen to approximately four.  
2. Establishment of limits on the passive loses that can be declared. 
3. Reduction in the top marginal rate from 50% to 28%.  
4. Reduction in corporate and capital gains tax.  
5. Widening of the tax base and increasing exemptions and standard deductions.  
These changes sought to reduce the loopholes utilized by the wealthy and increase 
compliance. However, despite the original intentions of TRA 86 to make the tax system 
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more equitable, the general public did not appear to perceive the decrease in progressivity 
to be fairer (Gerbing, 1988).  
Progressivity in the top income group decreased significantly, while the average 
federal tax on the middle-income group remained relatively unchanged.  The decreasing 
progressivity can be mostly attributed to the reduction on capital income taxation and 
estate taxation, which exclusively benefit wealthy households (Piketty and Saez, 2007). 
The higher the income bracket the higher the percentage of income earned through 
investment capital.  Over time, the tax system had grown to work in favor of those 
already in the top income bracket.  This point was further discussed by Fleischer (2007), 
who argued that the ability for fund managers to tax their profit- capital interest- at the 
long-term capital gains rate, is at conflict with a progressive income system. Further, tax 
deductions for charitable giving and Foreign Tax Credit allow the wealthiest individuals 
to pay an effective tax rate below their 35% top marginal rate. By 1990 the average tax 
rate for the op .01% had reduced to 35.4% while the average tax rate for the bottom 20% 
increased, although minimally, to about 16.2 % (Piketty and Saez, 2007). It is crucial to 
note that  that much of the decrease in progressivity was due to mainly to the drastic 
decrease in the average tax rate of the top .01%.  
An empirical study by Gerbing (1988) analyzed whether taxpayers believed that the 
implementation of TRA 1986 resulted in a fairer tax regime. Various questions were 
developed to measure the respondent’s attitudes and beliefs about the fairness of tax laws, 
particularly with regards to wealthy taxpayers and their ability to utilize special 
provisions, which enable them to pay less than their fair share. Gerbing found that in the 
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summer of 1987, after the implementation of TRA 86, the general public perceived the 
federal tax system as less fair.   
 
Empirical Examination 
Having explored the history of the US federal tax system and taxpayer attitudes 
towards taxation, I will now examine the implications of the changing structure of the 
federal tax system on taxpayer satisfaction. My study is broken down to answer two 
distinct questions.  
1. Is a taxpayer’s belief that his or her own federal income tax is too high 
affected by their actual average tax rates?  
2. Is a taxpayer’s belief that his or her own federal income tax is too high 
affected by the progressivity of the federal income tax?  
Prior research on tax perception within the realms of public policy assumes that 
households are homo economicus; the assumption that humans are rational and self 
interested and hence are able to perceive tax burdens, both their own and others, correctly 
(Blaufus, Bob, Hundsdoerfer, Kiesewetter, & Weimann, 2010). Taxpayers are assumed to 
have perfect knowledge and understanding, therefore, all opinions regarding the tax 
system are based upon the correct evaluation of the overall tax structure. 
It is intuitive to think that the actual average taxes paid by taxpayers will affect 
their satisfaction with the federal income tax. The lower their tax burden, the more 
satisfied they would be with the income tax system. Likewise, if taxpayer satisfaction is 
heavily determined on their perception of fairness and it is generally accepted that a 
progressive tax system is fair, then it seems logical to believe that the level of 
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progressivity should have an affect on taxpayer satisfaction. More specifically, higher 
degrees of progressivity would result in increased satisfaction with the tax system for 
households in the lower income bracket, and decreased satisfaction for households in the 
higher income bracket.  
Combing the general demographic data and taxpayer satisfaction measures from 
the General Social Survey (GSS) with the average tax rates calculated by Piketty and 
Saez (2003), I will attempt to determine whether this above relationship exists. Evidence 
to the contrary would suggest that either individuals are unable to calculate or are 
unaware of the taxes paid by others, or that individuals do not truly understand the 
meaning of progressivity, disclaiming the homo economicus assumption frequently used 
for tax policy. This will raise various public policy implications and may shed light to 
how governments might proceed to improve taxpayer satisfaction.   
 
THE DATA 
For this analysis, I will use data from the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS 
is an annual survey administered from 1972 that serves to collect data on demographic 
characteristics and attitudes of the public. 1 The questions range from opinions about 
government spending to the existence and nature of God. From this survey I extracted the 
questions concerning their attitudes towards federal income tax, as well as other 
questions regarding their demographics that I used to control for heterogeneity. 
Descriptions of the variables examined are presented in Table 2.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Survey	  was	  administered	  every	  year	  from	  1972	  to	  1994	  (except	  for	  the	  years	  1979,	  1981	  and	  1992)	  and	  every	  other	  year	  since	  1994	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Ideally I would like to have the response to a question regarding taxpayer’s 
attitudes towards the overall tax system.  Questions regarding each respondent’s attitude 
towards the overall current tax structure did exist in the survey but was only administered 
in selected years.2 Due to the constraints in available data, the question I used regarding 
attitudes towards their current tax rate asked in the questionnaire is the following: Do you 
consider the amount of federal income tax which you have to pay as too high, about right, 
or too low?  
I acknowledge that some respondents may interpret this question differently; Hess 
and Orphandies (1996) interpreted this question to measure respondents overall tax 
preference. For the purpose of this paper I will assume that at least some of the 
respondents interpreted the question correctly.  
Very few respondents stated that their taxes were “too low”, thus I combined 
respondents stating that they were “too low” with those stating they were “about right” to 
create the binary variable TAX. This variable will equal 1 if respondents felt their federal 
taxes were “too high” and 0 otherwise.  
The explanatory variable I consider to reflect the respondents effective federal tax 
rate is their estimated average tax rate, AVGTAX. The GSS did not have data regarding 
the respondents effective tax rate, however, it did include data regarding the respondents 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Questions	  on	  progressivity	  included	  in	  the	  GSS	  were	  the	  following:	  (1)	  how	  much	  income	  tax	  should	  the	  rich	  pay?	  Questions	  were	  included	  in	  1985	  and	  1990	  only.	  (2)	  Should	  the	  rich	  pay	  bigger	  share	  of	  taxes?	  Question	  was	  included	  in	  1987	  and	  2000	  (3)	  Taxes	  on	  high-­‐income	  people	  too	  high?	  (4)	  Taxes	  on	  middle-­‐income	  people	  too	  high?	  (5)	  Taxes	  on	  low-­‐income	  people	  too	  high?	  Questions	  3,4	  and	  5	  were	  administered	  in	  1987,	  1998	  and	  2006.	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income. The question provided income brackets that respondents fell into. 3 Using the 
midpoint, I made a rough estimate of the respondent’s income then generated a new 
variable QUINTILE, which further divided the respondents into 20 percent income 
brackets.  
Piketty and Saez’s (2007) paper estimated the average tax for income quintiles 
every year from 1960 to 2004. Using data from the pubic micro-file tax return data, they 
broke down the data into different income groups ranging from the second quintile (20-
40 percentile) to the top 0.01 percent (99.9-100 percentile). They defined income as all 
sources of market income, which not only include wages and salaries, but also includes 
bonuses and exercised stock options, self-employment income; dividends, interest, and 
rents, as well as realized capital gains.  They then proceeded to calculate the average tax 
by considering four federal taxes: the individual income tax; corporate income tax; estate 
(and gift) tax; and the payroll tax. The average tax was calculated using TAXSIM, after 
making several assumptions on tax incidence. 4 
I combined the two data sets by assigning the average tax calculated by Piketty 
and Saez to respondents based on their income quintile. The quintiles were calculated 
based on the income of the respondents of the survey. As the GSS is a nationally 
representative survey, I believe my estimated quintiles closely match actual quintiles for 
each year. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Over	  time,	  due	  to	  inflation,	  NORC	  has	  added	  brackets	  in	  which	  respondents	  can	  place	  their	  current	  income	  	  	  4	  TAXSIM	  is	  a	  program	  developed	  by	  the	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Research	  which	  allows	  one	  to	  calculate	  federal	  and	  state	  income	  tax	  liabilities.	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I also generated four additional variables to measure progressivity: WTOP, the 
average tax rate of the top .01%; AVGDIFF, the average difference in the tax rates from 
moving up a quintile; TBOT, the difference in the average tax rates of the top .01% and 
the bottom 20%; and TMID the difference in the average tax rates of the top .01% and the 
middle 40-60%.  
Piketty and Saez  (2007) found that the decrease in progressivity of the US federal 
tax system was heavily due to the significant drop in the average tax rate for the top 
.01%, while the change in the average tax rate for the rest of the population was, 
comparatively speaking, very limited.  Looking back to Table 1, we see that from 1960-
2004 the average tax rate for the 20-40th percentile income group up to the 99-99.5 
percentile income group changed by less than 6% whereas the average tax rate for the 
99.99-100 percentile income group dropped by 36.7%, from 71.4% to 34.7%. Although 
the data most likely did not include respondents in the top .01% group, I believe that it 
was most appropriate in illustrating progressivity because the change was concentrated at 
this level.  
Additional explanatory variables that I used to control for observable factors that 
may affect the respondents perception on TAX are the respondents household population, 
HOMPOP, the respondents income adjusted for inflation, ADJ_INCMID, the age of 
respondents, AGE, and the number of years they have been in school, EDUC.5 
Additionally MALE, WHITE, BLACK, EMPL and MARRIED are dummy variables for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  GSS	  provided	  several	  income	  ranges	  respondents	  could	  place	  themselves	  in.	  We	  took	  the	  midpoint	  of	  these	  income	  brackets,	  and	  then	  adjusted	  it	  for	  inflation	  to	  generate	  the	  variable	  ADJ_INCMID.	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whether the respondent is male, white, black, currently employed, and currently married, 
respectively.  
 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Modeling the relationship between the response to the tax question and average 
tax as a binary probabilistic choice problem, the probability that the ith respondent states 
that his/her taxes are “too high” is 
Pr(TAXi=1)= φ (β⋅AVGTAXi+δ⋅Zi)      (1) 
where AVGTAX is the ith respondent’s estimated average tax rate. 
The probability that the ith respondents states that his/her taxes are “too high” in 
response to the tax question and progressivity as a binary probability choice problem are  
Pr(TAXi=1)= φ (β⋅WTOPi+δ⋅Zi)      (2) 
Pr(TAXi=1)= φ (β⋅AVGDIFFi+δ⋅Zi)      (3) 
Pr(TAXi=1)= φ (β⋅TBOTi+δ⋅Zi)      (4) 
Pr(TAXi=1)= φ (β⋅TMIDi+δ⋅Zi)      (5) 
In all the above equations Zi is a vector of the additional observable characters I 
wish to control for. φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal 
distribution.  
The estimation results for equation (1) are reported in Table 3.  The first column 
presents my estimates based on the entire set of respondents, controlling for all of the 
variables. Results indicate that, even after controlling for income, as the average tax rate 
	   20	  
increases, the probability that respondents would be dissatisfied with their own taxes 
increases as well. This illustrates that there is more than an income effect taking place.  
To allow for variations in the relationship across different income groups, I ran 
separate regressions for each income quintile. My results indicate that the relationship 
between the average tax rate and satisfaction with their own tax is U-Shaped, that is, the 
relationship between AVGTAX and TAX increases as you move up the income quintile 
reaching a peak at the third quintile, then falls for higher income quintiles. In the second 
column we see that for the first quintile, a 1% point increase in AVGTAX increases the 
likelihood that the respondent is dissatisfied with their current tax by 1.2 percentage 
points or 3.1%. 6 Moving up to the third quintile, a 1 percentage point increase in 
AVGTAX increases the likelihood that the respondent is dissatisfied with their taxes by 
7.7 percentage points or 15.1%, but as you move up to the fifth quintile the likelihood 
falls to about 2.3 percentage points or 4.4%.7 The middle class’ satisfaction with their 
own taxes is significantly affected by variations in their own tax rate, while the bottom 
and top quintiles are much less affected.  
The estimation results for equations (2) to (5) are presented in Table 4.1 to 4.4. In 
contrast to my hypothesis, there is a positive relationship between all of the progressivity 
variables   and TAX, a binary variable equal to 1 if respondents state their taxes are too 
high and 0 otherwise. This correlation is consistent even after breaking them down into 
income quintiles. Across the quintiles, respondent’s dissatisfaction with their own tax 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  A	  2.5%	  point	  increase	  is	  a	  6.4%	  increase	  from	  the	  base	  rate	  of	  39.3%.	  Base	  rates	  were	  calculated	  by	  taking	  the	  means	  of	  respondents	  answer	  to	  TAX	  for	  every	  income	  quintile.	  	  7	  Base	  rates	  for	  the	  third	  and	  fifth	  quintile	  are	  51%	  and	  52.7%,	  respectively.	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rates increases as progressivity increases. The strength of the relationship between TAX 
and progressivity variables were consistent throughout. 8 A percentage point increase in 
WTOP, the average rate of taxes paid by the top .01%, AVGDIFF, the average difference 
in average taxes paid by each income quintile, TBOT, the difference in average taxes 
paid by the top .01% and bottom 20%, and TMID, the difference in the average taxes 
paid by the top .01% and middle 40-60%, increased the likelihood for dissatisfaction by 
approximately 1.95%, 9.19%, 1.87% and 1.78% respectively, across each quintile. 9  
To analyze this point further, I ran similar probit regressions after controlling for 
AVGTAX. The probability that the ith respondents states that his/her taxes are “too high” 
in response to the tax question and progressivity as a binary probability choice problem, 
after controlling for AVGTAX is  
Pr(TAXi=1)= φ (β⋅PROGi+AVGTAX+δ⋅Zi)    (6) 
where PROGi is any one of the progressivity variable WTOP, AVGDIFF, TBOT or 
TMID.  
Here, I hoped to illuminate how a respondent would react to changes in 
progressivity after controlling for changes in their own tax rate.  In doing so, I was able to 
isolate the dissatisfaction that arise from absolute changes in ones own taxes from the 
dissatisfaction which arise from relative changes in taxes. Table 5.2 presents the results 
from regressing TAX on AVGDIFF after controlling for the previous explanatory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  This	  finding	  is	  interesting	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  U-­‐Shaped	  relationship	  between	  AVGTAX	  and	  TAX	  previously	  presented	  in	  Table	  3	  	  9	  Values	  presented	  on	  the	  tables	  are	  percentage	  points.	  To	  calculate	  the	  percentage	  change,	  we	  divide	  the	  percentage	  point	  by	  the	  base	  rate.	  Actual	  average	  percentage	  changes	  across	  the	  different	  quintiles	  for	  WTOP,	  AVGDIFF,	  TBOT	  and	  TMID	  are	  5.3%,	  24.6%,	  4.9%	  and	  4.7%,	  respectively.	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variables and AVGTAX. 10 Similar to our previous findings, results show a positive 
correlation between TAX and AVGDIFF, indicating that when progressivity increases, 
respondents are more likely to be dissatisfied with their own tax burden even if there are 
no changes to their own rate. The direction and strength of the correlation were similar 
across each quintile. 11 The similar regression results would indicate that respondents 
evaluate their own taxes in relative terms. That is, a taxpayer that paid a tax rate of 15% 
in year one and 15% in year two will feel their burden has increased, if in year two 
everyone else’s taxes fell to 10%.  However, this would presume that taxpayers are aware 
of what others are paying. This is particularly interesting, as the positive nature of the 
correlation between TAX and all of our progressivity variables across every quintile 
would suggest the opposite.  
An increase in progressivity would significantly benefit respondents in the lower 
quintile and at the same time hurt respondents in the upper quintile, yet in the above cases 
there exist no variations in the relationship across all the quintiles in both magnitude and 
direction. If the assumptions of homo economicus were true, and individuals are in fact 
able to calculate and perceive their individual and others tax rates correctly, respondents 
in the lower quintile should be able to recognize the benefits of higher progressivity and 
be more satisfied as progressivity increases. The correlation between the progressivity 
variables and TAX should thus be negative. Likewise, respondents in the upper quintile 
should recognize the damage from an increase in progressivity. The correlation between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Regression	  results	  for	  WTOP,	  TBOT	  and	  TMID	  are	  presented	  in	  table	  5.1,	  5.3	  and	  5.4,	  respectively.	  	  11	  A	  1%	  point	  increase	  in	  AVGDIFF	  would	  increase	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  respondent	  would	  be	  dissatisfied	  with	  their	  own	  tax	  rate	  9.92%,	  8.44%,	  7.65%,	  9.49%	  and	  5.88%	  for	  quintiles	  1	  through	  5,	  respectively.	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the progressivity variables and TAX should be positive and stronger for respondents in 
these quintiles. The absence of such variation suggests that the poor are not recognizing 
the benefits from an increase in progressivity, and the rich do not seem to be bothered by 
the harm from an increase in progressivity.   
Past studies regarding tax perception have found that an individual’s educational 
attainment is the most important variable in determining a respondent’s ability to 
correctly perceive their tax burden. Konig	   et	   al.	   (1995)	   found	   that	   school	   education	  was	   the	   main	   determinant	   of	   taxpayer	   misperception	   on	   individual	   marginal	   tax	  rates.	   Further,	   Hundsdoerfer	   and	   Sicthmann	   (2007)	   reveal	   that	   even	   physicians	  have	  difficulties	  in	  correctly	  estimating	  tax	  rates.	  This	  implies	  that	  what	  is	  important	  is	   not	   only	   the	   level	   of	   education,	   but	   the	   type	   of	   knowledge	   the	   respondent	   has;	  more	   specifically,	   economic	   knowledge	   (Blaufus,	   K.,	   Bob,	   J.,	   Hundsdoerfer,	   J.,	  Kiesewetter,	  D.,	  &	  Weimann,	  J.,	  2010).	   
My results show that education is consistently negatively correlated to TAX. This 
suggests that the more education the respondent attains, the more satisfied they will be 
with their own tax rate. This result was consistent in all of the regressions for all quintiles 
except for the first, 0-20th percentile. This finding was similar to results from an empirical 
study by Niemirowski et al (2002) who found that poor knowledge on the tax system 
increased taxpayers’ distrust for the government (Hofmann, Hoelzl, & Kirchler, 2008).  
I further analyzed this by allowing variations in the correlation between TAX to 
AVGTAX and the other progressivity variables, by performing the same regressions after 
dividing respondents based on their educational attainment.  Respondents were broken 
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down into 4 distinct groups; less than high school, high school, College/some College 
and advanced degree. 12  
Table 6 presents a summary of our results. We see that the strength of the 
correlation between TAX and AVGTAX, and TAX and the various progressivity 
variables, increases the higher the education attained by the respondent. Individuals with 
higher education are more responsive to changes in the tax rate.  Respondents with a 
higher education are more likely able to understand the tax system and keep up with 
news, thus are able to form their opinions based on actual tax rates rather than, lets say, 
opinions of their peers. Therefore, it seems intuitive that opinions of those with higher 
education are more closely linked to variations in their actual average tax rate.  
 
Conclusion  This	   paper	   has	   discussed	   the	   falling	   progressivity	   in	   the	   US	   federal	   tax	  system	  and	   increasing	   income	   inequality	   since	   the	  1960’S,	   and	   its	   implications	  on	  taxpayer	  satisfaction.	  Several	  important	  findings	  emerge.	  	  First,	   the	  effect	  of	   taxpayers	  real	  average	   tax	  rate	  on	   their	   satisfaction	  with	  the	  tax	  system	  follows	  a	  U-­‐shaped	  pattern.	  Middle-­‐income	  taxpayers	  views	  on	  their	  tax	   system	   are	   significantly	   affected	   by	   changes	   in	   their	   actual	   tax	   rates,	   while	  taxpayers	   in	   the	   low	   and	   high	   income	   brackets	   are	   less	   affected.	   The	   reasoning	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Based	  on	  the	  variable	  EDUC,	  we	  divided	  up	  respondents	  into	  4	  distinct	  groups.	  Individuals	  earning	  less	  than	  12	  years	  of	  schooling,	  less	  than	  high	  school	  ;	  individuals	  with	  exactly	  12	  years	  of	  schooling,	  high	  school;	  individuals	  with	  between	  13-­‐16	  years	  of	  schooling,	  college/	  some	  college;	  and	  individuals	  earning	  more	  than	  16	  degrees	  of	  schooling,	  advanced	  degree.	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behind	   this	   finding	   is	   still	  unknown	  and	   is	  an	  area	   that	  can	  be	  explored	  deeper	   in	  future	  studies.	  	  Second,	   contrary	   to	   our	   hypothesis,	   taxpayers	   dissatisfaction	   and	  progressivity	   have	   a	   positive	   correlation	   across	   all	   income	   groups.	   That	   is,	   an	  increase	  in	  progressivity	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  taxpayer	  will	  be	  dissatisfied	  with	  their	  taxes	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  change	  is	  beneficial	  or	  detrimental	  to	  the	  taxpayer.	  An	  increase	  in	  progressivity	  would	  benefit	  taxpayers	  in	  the	  lower	  income	  bracket,	  and	  hurt	  taxpayers	  in	  the	  upper	  income	  bracket,	  but	  our	  findings	  show	  that	  the	   correlation	  between	  our	  progressivity	  variables	  and	  TAX	  were	  positive	  and	  of	  equal	   magnitude	   across	   all	   quintiles.	   	   This	   finding	   was	   consistent	   even	   after	  controlling	  for	  changes	  in	  the	  respondent’s	  own	  tax	  rates.	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  homo	  economicus	  assumption	  may	  be	  inappropriate	  in	  the	  context	  of	  taxation.	  Similar	   to	   findings	   from	   previous	   research,	  my	   findings	   suggest	   that	   taxpayers	   in	  fact	  do	  not	  fully	  understand	  the	  current	  federal	  tax	  system	  and	  are	  unaware	  of	  the	  actual	  level	  of	  progressivity.	  Despite	  preferences	  for	  a	  more	  progressive	  tax	  system,	  taxpayers	  fail	  to	  recognize	  changes	  to	  progressivity.	  	  Thirdly,	   the	   actual	   level	   of	   the	   respondents	   average	   tax	   and	   progressivity	  affect	   the	  taxpayers	  satisfaction	  with	  the	   income	  tax	  system	  more	   for	  respondents	  with	  higher	  education.	  The	  higher	  the	  level	  of	  education	  attained,	  the	  less	  are	  their	  opinions	  grounded	  on	   their	  preconceived	  demographic	  variables	  and	  more	  by	   the	  current	  level	  of	  taxation.	  	  Given	   these	   findings,	   it	   seems	   that	   simply	   adopting	   the	   “Buffet	  Rule”	   is	  not	  sufficient	   in	   increasing	   taxpayer	   satisfaction.	   Tax	   administrators	   should	   rather	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consider	  ways	  to	  better	  inform	  and	  educate	  the	  public	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  US	  federal	  tax	  system.	  The current US Tax Code has over 67,000 pages and includes high 
levels of abstraction and numerous technical terms. The commissioner of the Internal 
Revenue Service, Douglas Shulman, publicly admitted that he used a tax preparer to do 
his federal income tax return because he found the US tax code too complex (Ballasy, 
2010). If the commissioner finds difficulty in understanding the US Tax Code, it is 
unsurprising that the majority of the public does as well.  Information	  regarding	   the	  effective	  average	   tax	  rate	   for	   the	  various	   income	  groups	   is	   already	   easily	   accessible;	   therefore	   efforts	   should	   be	   targeted	   so	   that	  taxpayers	   are	   able	   to	   actually	   understand	   the	   meaning	   of	   progressivity	   both	   in	  abstract	   and	   real	   terms.	   The	   availability	   of	   resources	   and	   programs	   to	   increase	  taxpayer	   understanding	   for	   all	   income	   levels,	   would	   allow	   taxpayers	   to	   gauge	  changes	   in	   the	   tax	   system	   themselves.	   	   Better	   understanding	   would	   increase	  taxpayer’s	   trust	   in	   the	   government	   and,	   perhaps	   more	   importantly,	   taxpayer’s	  opinions	  on	  the	  level	  of	  taxation	  can	  be	  grounded	  on	  variables	  that	  the	  government	  can	   observe	   and	   amend.	   	   Although	   emphasis	   is	   currently	   put	   on	   increasing	   the	  progressivity	   of	   the	   US	   tax	   system,	  my	   findings	   suggest	   that	   addressing	   concerns	  regarding	  the	  overall	  complexity	  of	  the	  US	  tax	  law	  should	  be	  the	  long-­‐term	  priority	  for	  Congress.	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